Natural Gas (NG), one of the cleanest, most efficient and useful of all energy sources, is a vital component of the world's energy supply. To make the NG more convenient for storage and transportation, it is refined and condensed into a liquid called liquefied natural gas (LNG). In an LNG site, safety is a long-team critical issue. The emergency shutdown system (ESS) in the LNG receiving terminal is used to automatically stop the pumps and isolate the leakage section. Fault tree analysis (FTA) has been widely used to characterize the logical functional relationships among components and subsystems of a system, and to identify the root causes of failures in a system. In the conventional FTA for the ESS, we assume that exact failure probabilities of events are available. However, in real applications the FTA for the ESS needs to be done at an early design or manufacturing stage at which certain new components may have to be used without failure data. Also, sometimes due to environmental changes in the ESS during the operation periods, it is difficult to gather past exact failures data for the FTA. Hence there may not be sufficient information for a conventional FTA. In this research, we propose an intuitionistic fuzzy (IF) sets theory based approach for the FTA which can be used when the conventional FTA cannot. We generate the IF fault-tree interval and the IF reliability interval for the ESS. Based on IF-FTA, we also present an algorithm for finding the critical components and determining weak paths in the ESS for which the key improvement event must be made.
Introduction
The natural gas (NG), one of the cleanest, most efficient and useful of all energy sources for residential and industrial customers, is a vital element of the world's energy supply. It is a combustible mixture of hydrocarbon gases and its composition can vary a great deal. Table  1 shows the main ingredients and their percentages; the primary ingredient is the methane (CH 4 ) but heavier gaseous hydrocarbons such as ethane (C 2 H 6 ), propane (C 3 H 8 ) and butane (C 4 H 10 ) and trace gases are also present.
Component
Typical Weight % Methane CH 4 70-90 Ethane C 2 H 6 5-15 Propane (C 3 H 8 ) and Butane (C 4 H 10 )
< 5 CO 2 , N 2 , H 2 S, etc. Balance Table 1 . Typical composition of natural gas
To make the NG more convenient in further storage and transportation, it is refined to remove impurities such as water, hydrogen sulfide and other compounds which could cause problems for downstream conveyance or environmental pollution. After refining, the clean NG at nearly atmospheric pressure is condensed by cooling it to approximately -162 degrees Celsius into a liquid form, resulting in the liquefied natural gas (LNG). The LNG is about 1/600th the volume of that of the NG at standard temperature and pressure. It can be delivered by specially designed cryogenic vessels and cryogenic tankers over long distances. It is returned to the gas form through gasification at end-use facilities. Generally, mass volumes of the LNG are conveyed and stored often in the proximity of densely populated area. Due to its highly flammable and explosive nature, accidents involving LNG can lead to loss of human lives and serious damages to industrial facilities and the natural environment. Because of these, high reliability and safety is a long-term crucial issue for the LNG industry. The reliability of a huge quantity of the LNG stockpiled in a conveying system (which mostly consists of pipes and storage tanks) is a major issue affecting the LNG receiving terminal safety. During the LNG processing process, even a small amount of the LNG leakage may cause considerable contamination, fire accidents or explosions. Consequently, to prevent leakage, an emergency shutdown system (ESS) in the LNG receiving terminal is implemented to automatically stop the LNG pumping and isolate the leakage condition. For the reliability of equipments and operational procedures at the LNG receiving terminals, the failure information provided by the ESS is considered to be the most vital resources for the safety and thus deserves particular attention. A typical LNG plant devotes a substantial amount of manpower and capital towards the monitoring and investigation of failure events which trigger off the ESS in order to learn the underlying causes of these failure events. In order to understand the LNG receiving terminal reliability, an effective analysis and performance measure based on the failure information gathered by the ESS is required. The fault tree analysis (FTA) has been widely employed in variety of systems for providing logical functional relationships among components and subsystems of a system, and identifying root causes of the undesired system failures (9; 12) . In this research, we first describe the detailed LNG receiving procedure and then its FTA on the basis of the failure information from the ESS. For this description of the FTA, we assume that all the malfunction events provided by the ESS are fully understood; that is, exact data of their failure probability collected from normal operations of the LNG receiving terminal are www.intechopen.com Reliability measures for liqueied natural gas receiving terminal based on the failure information of emergency shutdown system 593 available. We then present the traditional reliability measure of the FTA for the LNG receiving terminal based on the failure information of the ESS.
However, collecting precise failures data for the FTA requires substantial amount of time and knowledge of operations and maintenance on the LNG receiving terminal. In real operations, the following scenarios often occur:
• FTA for the ESS needs to be done at an early design or manufacturing stage at which certain new components may have to be used without prior failure data, and
• due to environmental changes in the ESS during the operation periods, it may be difficult to gather past exact failures data for the FTA.
Under these uncertain situations, traditionally system engineers usually omit ambiguous failure events of the ESS when they construct or analyze the fault tree. But such omitted events may actually be critical, and the measure of reliability of the LNG receiving terminal that does not take into consideration such events may be unreliable. In order to handle inevitable imprecise failure information in diversified real applications, many research works have taken the uncertain situations into consideration. Chen (7) (8) , and pattern recognition (14) . In this research, with imprecise failure information from the ESS, we apply fuzzy fault tree (20) and Posbist fault tree (11) methods to construct fuzzy reliability measures for the LNG receiving terminal and provide the corresponding IF fault-tree interval and the IF reliability interval. We also compare the results of these proposed reliability measures for the FTA methods. Further, we will discuss identification of the most critical component of the LNG receiving terminal which is essential for determining weak paths and areas where the key improvements must be made.
LNG-ESS Fault Diagnosis

The Operation Process of the LNG Receiving Terminal
Most LNG is imported from exporters such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Qatar by long-term contract carriers. In this paper, we investigate an LNG receiving terminal located in Asia, Taiwan. When the LNG vessels arrive at the LNG terminal, the LNG they carry is discharged and stored at about −160 0 C and 0.2kg/cm 2 in storage tanks. Through an open rack vaporizer, the stored LNG is reheated and gasified into natural gas. The open rack vaporizer is connected to a storage and trunk-line distribution network through which the natural gas is transported to local distribution companies, independent power plants and households. A typical process diagram of the LNG receiving terminal is given in Figure 1 which shows the receiving, storage, vaporization and distribution components of a receiving terminal and how these components are connected. Normally, the LNG must be kept cold in order to remain in liquid form. However, because of heat coming from the outside ambient atmosphere, there is inevitably a certain amount of boil-off gas (BOG). The BOG can be re-liquefied through a BOG compressor and a recondenser. The recondenser has an emergency isolation valve to keep the liquid lever from falling too low or raising too high to prevent the internal pressure from rising abnormally. It has two primary functions. First, it recycles BOG when the LNG is stored and transported through pipelines. Second, through secondary stage pumps which are submerged high-pressure centrifugal pumps, it provides buffer control to LNG which is flammable even at ultra-low temperatures. The secondary stage pumps are used to collect the LNG from the recondenser, and then pressurize and pump the LNG to the open rack vaporizer. The open rack vaporizer consists of finned tubes submerged in seawater. When the LNG flows through the tubes, heat exchange between the seawater outside of the tubes and the LNG inside takes place, and the LNG is re-gasifies and return to its original gaseous state. Before leaving the receiving terminal, the natural gas is measured for its quantities through a measure station. Other related systems such as the cold power generator (CPG), pressure power generator (PPG) and air separation plant (ASP) are set up for the purposes that achieve the goals of energy conservation and energy recycling.
In case of a LNG leakage, the emergency shutdown system (ESS) in the LNG receiving terminal can be automatically invoked to isolate the leakage pipe section in the unloaded dock district and the tank district and to stop the primary pumps. 
Fault-Tree Analysis of the ESS
Prior to the actual construction of the ESS fault tree, it is essential to have an in-depth understanding about related equipments involved in the ESS. Incidents related to the LNG facilities are generally classified into two classes, namely internal events and external events. The former include equipment failures, miss-operation and other incidents resulted from internal causes within a site. The latter include the device breakdown and the pipe leakage due to typhoon or earthquake. In this paper, we make the following assumptions which are necessary for the construction of the fault-tree analysis (FTA) of the ESS.
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• Our primary concern is focused on internal events with the ESS.
• We consider only the isolating valve closest to the point of leakage; in other word, only the first level of isolating mechanism was taken into account.
• The entire isolation procedure is considered to have failed if the isolating device did not function correctly.
• All failures are independent events.
Based on the descriptions in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, the fault tree of the ESS is developed and shown in Figure 2 , whose subevents and bottom events are listed in Tables 2 and 3 . Traditionally, the reliability measure of the FTA of the "ESS Fault" can be obtained as follows:
where ∩ means relation of parallel "and" operation) and ∪ means series ("or" operation). Let f i represent the crisp (precise) failure rate of event i. Then the crisp failure probability of the "ESS Fault", denoted by f T , can be computed as follows
www.intechopen.com Fig. 3 . IF set of a real number R.
Intuitionistic Fuzzy Reliability Measure of FTA
In the conventional FTA for the ESS of the LNG terminal, we must fully understand the ESS. Usually, we assume that exact failure probabilities of events are available. However, collecting failures data for the FTA is a challenging task requiring extensive human expertise and knowledge of operations and maintenance on the system. In real operations, this may not even be possible as the FTA for the ESS of the LNG receiving terminal needs to be made at an early design or manufacturing stage at which we have no failure data on new components. Furthermore, sometimes the environmental change in the system during the operation periods can also make it more difficult to gather past exact failures data for the FTA. In such uncertain situations, traditionally system engineers usually omit some ambiguous failure events of the ESS when measuring the reliability of the LNG receiving terminal. But the missing events or probability information might be critical and thus omitting these may lead to unreliable decision results. In order to handle inevitable imprecise failure information of the ESS, which has been recognized as one of the uncertainties in the real world, a possible solution is to use intuitionistic fuzzy (IF) sets, defined by Atanassov (2; 3).
IF-FTA on the ESS
Definition 3.1. Let a set U be fixed. An intuitionistic fuzzy (IF) setã of U is an object having the form,ã = {x, u(x), v(x)|x ∈ U} where the function uã : U → [0, 1] and vã : U → [0, 1] measure the degree of membership and the degree of non-membership, respectively, of an x ∈ U as a potential member of setã ⊂ U, and 0 ≤ u(x) + v(x) ≤ 1 for x ∈ U.
Clearly, the IF set uses a degree of truth membership function µã(x) and a degree of falsity membership function vã(x) to represent lower bound µã(x) and upper bound 1 − vã(x) such that µã(x) + vã(x) ≤ 1. By complementing the membership degree with a non-membership degree that expresses to what extent the element does not belong to the IF set, the interval [µã(x), 1 − vã(x)] can extend the fuzzy set of membership function. The uncertainty or hesitation can be quantified for each x inã by the length of the interval πã(x) = 1 − vã(x) − µã(x). A small πã(x) represents that we are more decisive about x, and a large πã(x) represents that we are more uncertain about x. Obviously, when µã(x) = 1 − vã(x) for all elements of the universe, the traditional fuzzy set concept is recovered. As an example, Figure 3 shows an IF set of a real number R. Note that when a 1 = a ′ 1 , c 1 = c ′ 1 and a 2 = a ′ 2 , c 2 = c ′ 2 , the IF set is changed from Figure 4 to Figure 5 , and its four arithmetic operations become much more easy.
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Let ⊕, ⊖ and ⊗ be binary operations between two IF setsf A andf B corresponding to the operations • = +, −, and ×, respectively. Then we have the following useful results of operations on the IF set (2). www.intechopen.com
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A ⊕f B ={(a
a is a crisp number with value m if its membership function is defined by
which is also denoted by1 {m} . According to equation (2), the IF set failure possibility of the "ESS Fault", denoted byf T , can be computed bỹ
It should be noted thatf A ⊗f B is represented by eitherf A ⊗ productf B orf A ⊗ minf B , whose operations are described in Proposition 3.1. The collected data of IF failure interval are listed in Table 4 (5) www.intechopen.com
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The Critical Components on the ESS
In order to find the critical components in the system based on IF-FTA and determine weak paths in the ESS where key improvement event must be made, we expand Tanaka et al's (20) fuzzy-FTA definition and redefine the influence degree of every bottom event through implementing four arithmetic operations of the triangle IF set as shown in Proposition 3.1.
Definition 3.2.
Denote byf T i the computation result that the ith bottom event of failure interval (delete the ith bottom event) is not included in thef T shown in equation (3), and denote by V (f T ,f T i ) the difference betweenf T andf T i ; that is,
A larger value of V (f T ,f T i ) represents the ith bottom event has a greater influence onf T .
Therefore, according to Definition 3.2, we can calculate V (f T ,f T i ) for i = A, B, · · · , G, the IF failure difference between overall and partial (with second level nodes deleted) fault-tree, for obtaining the most critical system event of the "ESS Fault". Table 5 shows the ranks of such differences. Based on these results, the failure of BOG (Boil Off Gas) pipes and isolation valve of BOG pipe failing to close (event "C") and ICD pipes and isolation valve of ICD pipe failing to close (event "D") are the first and second significant events leading to ESD failure. Because of this, the components involved in these events require particular attention in daily maintenance. From the well known 80/20 rule, we can effectively reduce 80% of risk if we can have 20% of critical equipments under our control. Daily monitoring of such critical components will help to significantly reduce the change of failure. Finally, for ease of implementation in real applications, we provide a step-by-step procedure of the IF-FTA on the ESS as follows:
Step 1. Construct fault-tree logic diagram, fault-tree logical symbols such as "AND" gate and "OR" gate, for all the faults under the top level event shown in Figure 2 . Use these to represent the sequence of faults and causes and trace back whole process from top to bottom events.
Step 2. Obtain the possible failure intervals of bottom events shown in Table 4 based on the aggregation of the ESS information and expert's knowledge and experience.
Step 3. calculate the "ESS Fault" reliability result by using equation (3).
Step 4. Find the influential bottom events of the system reliability by using equation (6).
Step 5. Discuss the results and make suggestions.
Reliability Measures Methods for FTA
In this section, we briefly review existing reliability measures for the FTA within reliability theory and compare the results of the existing approaches and our proposed methods. Traditionally, probability method is the method for dealing with the heterogeneous problems, and probability can only show the randomness of success or failure events. The usage of this method depends on the availability of a large amount of sample data and complete knowledge of all event outcomes. We calculated the failure possibility of the top event "ESS Fault" based on equation (2) using the crisp failure probabilities, b i , in Table 4 and obtained f T = 7.4631 × 10 −2 .
Posbist reliability theory, developed by Cai (10) , is one of the forms of fuzzy reliability theories that have been proposed. It uses the possibility assumption and the fuzzy state assumption in place of the probability assumption or the binary state assumption. For systems with extremely small failure probabilities or when necessary statistical data are scarce, the posbist reliability theory has certain advantages for evaluating system reliability and safety (11) . Based on the fault tree of failure of the ESS shown in Figure 3 and the corresponding failure possibility of every basic event listed in Table 4 , we have identified the failure possibility of the top event by using the Posbist reliability theory and this value is f T = 3.95 × 10 −2 .
The results of the existing approaches and our proposed methods are shown in Figure 6 and Table 6 . For comparisons, we find that the failure possibilities of Posbist under different α-level are the same with crisp failure possibility of event "C 4 ". This is because the Posbist select the maximal failure possibility of bottom events. In this case, this simple assessment could possibly overlook the potential risk on the ESS reliability and safety. The results of the proposed "and-by-product" or "and-by-min" method could cover both the results of the crisp failure possibility and the fuzzy FTA approach (20) . The differences between proposed two "and" operations are that "and-by-product" gives more consistent results because the center of its estimated result is the same with the crisp failure possibility and the fuzzy FTA approach. Also, "and-by-min" can give the more safety results because it selects the least possibility in each event connected by the "and" gate without underestimating the failure interval.
Conclusions
Traditionally, we assume that exact probabilities of failure events are available and fully understood. However, in real applications for various reasons it is often difficult to obtain the past exact failures data. In this paper, to handle uncertain situations and inevitable imprecise information occurring in the liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal emergency shut-down system (ESS), we propose a new approach which integrates intuitionistic fuzzy (IF) set operations on fault-tree analysis (FTA) to compute the IF fault-tree interval, traditional reliability and IF reliability interval based on the failure information gathered by the ESS. Moreover, based on IF-FTA, we present an algorithm to find the critical components and determine weak paths in the ESS where key improvement events must be made. The failures of BOG (Boil Off Gas) pipes, isolation valve of BOG pipe failing to close (event "C") and ICD pipes, isolation valve of ICD pipe failing to close (event "D"), are the first and second significant events leading to ESD failure. As such, particular attention must be paid to the related components in the daily maintenance to effectively reduce risk; 80% of the risk can be removed when 20% of critical equipments are under our control. A step-by-step procedure of the IF-FTA on the ESS is also presented for easy implementation in real applications. Finally, the result of this proposed methodology is briefly compared with the existing FTA approaches. 
2.1484E-07(7) 1.2764E-02(3) www.intechopen.com Natural Gas 606
